last half century. Unfortunately this general theory adopted by the mainstream is not Keynes's General Theory. Instead it is Debreu's general equilibrium theory. Consequently any deviation from the competitive general equilibrium of Debreu that rigorous economic scientists analyze is thought to be simply special cases (models) of Debreu's general theory 1 .
Weintraub argues that the boundaries of the disciplines of mathematics and economics
are determined by what is being practiced in the separate communities of mathematicians and economists respectively. Accordingly, there is boundary between these two communities. When these practices of mathematicians meet and cross the boundary (typically in a unilateral direction from math to economics), views about what constitutes knowledge and beliefs in economics change. It is the history of this change that Weintraub tries to chronicle in the eight chapters of his book.
In the first chapter, Weintraub notes that, in the nineteenth century, mathematics --as represented by the marginal revolution -was already part of the accepted practice of economists. Nevertheless at the time there was a good deal of controversy as to the scientific status and boundaries of an economics discipline that well into the 20 th century was still alive with other practices as developed by the German Historical School, the Austrian School, the American Institutionalists, etc.
At the end of the 19 th century, however, European mathematicians --except in Cambridge, England --were reconstructing their discipline as a crisis concerning the very foundations of mathematics became apparent. This crises had three major threads: (1) the foundations of geometry specifically Euclidean geometry 's failure "to domesticate" the nonEuclidean geometries; (2) the failure of set theory, and (3) paradoxes in the foundations of arithmetic and logic. Responses to these challenges left mathematicians unsure of what was right and true.
At about the same time, the discipline of physics's (especially rational mechanics) failure to deal with new problems of thermodynamics, quanta and relativity led to a crisis. Plank and
Einstein gives birth to a new physics of: statistical mechanics, quantum mechanics, and relativity theory. This required mathematical physicists to think in terms of new models of the universe.
These new physical models were based less on the mathematics of Newton and deterministic systems and more on statistical argumentation and algebra (p.11). "Consequently, mathematical physics was to link up with newer mathematical ideas in algebra (e.g., group theory) and probability theory (e.g.,measure theory) as mathematicians took up the challenge to work on mathematical ideas that could facilitate the understanding of the world" (pp.10-1)
In the 20th century mathematicians sought new foundations for their subject based on axiomatization. By the 1920s and 1930s mathematics appeared to become clear and coherent again after its foundations's crisis of the turn of the century. According to Weintraub the history of 20th century science indicates that the problems, paradoxes, and confusions existing in the turn of the century mathematics were resolved by conceptualizing the fundamental objects of mathematics just as physics had reframed the building blocks of the natural world.
At the turn of the century in the Cambridge of Marshall and the early Keynes, however, the mathematics studied differed from European mathematics. In Cambridge the emphasis remained on mathematics as applied to 19th century physics problems in mechanics and optics.
Thus, in Cambridge at that time, rigor meant that the analysis was "based on a substrata of physical reasoning" (p.17). This antediluvian view "retarded understanding of pure mathematics as a logical, or structural, discipline. remember Joan Robinson often saying "I did not study math, therefore I had to think about economic problems". In other words, as I will explain in greater detail later, Joan's objection was not to mathematical logic per se. What Joan was objecting to was the axioms that was the foundation of Debreu's general equilibrium theory -the black box of economics in Weintraub's nomenclature-that was never questioned in applying this non-Keynes general theory to explaining the economic problems of the real world.
But I digress from Weintraub's chronological explanation of how mathematicians changed their view of what constituted "proofs" and "truth" and how these changes impacted the mainstream community of economists. To provide a glimpse of how mathematicians' vision of their discipline was changing, Weintraub cites Felix Klein, a turn of the century German mathematician who distinguished between naive intuition and. refined intuition. The former required constructs in geometry, the latter "arises though the logical development from axioms considered as perfectly exact". Klein believed that no one could ever arrive at a fully axiomatized state but that mathematics had advanced by combining intuition with axioms in the refined intuition approach.
At the end of the 19th century having a mathematical model of a phenomenon without having a physical model of that phenomenon might be considered "non-rigorous" mathematics.
Once axiomatization as the foundation for scientific (mathematical) theory is explicitly recognized, however, then it is possible "to have a mathematical model of a phenomenon without having a physical model of the phenomenon" (p. 37) and still provide "rigor" and "truth".
In Chapter 2, Weintraub notes that as opposed to the pluralistic economics discipline of the pre second world war era, post-war economics has become a monolithic mathematical "the classical theorists represent Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world who, discovering that in experiences straight lines apparently parallel often meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight --as the only remedy for the unfortunate collisions which are occurring. Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required tody in economics. We need to throw over the second postulate of the classical doctrine and to work out the behaviour of a system in which involuntary unemployment in the strict sense is possible" [Keynes, 1936, pp. 16-7] .
In Chapter 3, Weintraub indicates that in economics "there is widespread confusion about the nature and interconnections among 'rigor', 'axiomatics' and 'formalism'. The mathematician Denis Hilbert is credited with believing that formal axiomatic systems are a powerful tool for mathematical research. Hilbert argued that some fundamental axioms are the basis for the "progressive development" of knowledge in a field (p. 86). Independence and consistency between the fundamental axioms are the foundation of knowledge. Axiomization was seen as a method for organizing and systematizing mathematical systems. Thus by 1930 Hilbert and other mathematicians, by the use of axiomatics, were developing mathematical structures that could be used in applied fields of physics. This approach required "that the axiomatization be consistent in terms of systems that are ...fundamental.....If one has a consistent system, a particular proposition expressible in that system will either be true or false (in that system) else that system is not complete. Of course, one can add as an axiom to the system a proposition which is neither true nor false in the system and thus make the system more complete. The completeness of the system thus is tied to the problem of the decidability of propositions". (p. 89-90 emphasis added). Whenever a system is consistent and complete, then "mathematization settled the epistemological quest for certainty" (p. 90) Weintraub argues that it was this Hilbert-type axiomatic approach that played a decisive role in the development of mathematical economics via the Cowles Commission and the Econometric Society in the early post war period.
At this point Weintraub makes a statement, that I disagree with. Weintraub states that
Post Keynesians (among others) have argued that this axiomatic approach essentially subverted economics in the 20th century (p. 91). I can not speak for all the "others" but it should be clear that when Keynes uses his non-Euclidean geometry metaphor (cited above) he was trying to use axiomatics to reorient classical economics to the real world. Also in many writings in the last two decades (e.g., Davidson, 1982 Davidson, -1983 Davidson, , 1984 Davidson, , 1994 I have argued that Keynes's general theory analysis was an axiomatic based approach that required fewer restrictive axioms than the classical system. Moreover, as Keynes noted in defending his fewer axiomatic approach as being a more general theory, "It is for those who make a highly special assumption to justify it rather than for those who dispense with it to prove a general negative". In that sense Keynes was not only a developer of economics as a mathematical (axiom-oriented) logical scientist, but he was one that had a pragmatic vision of a physical process in mind. In essence therefore Keynes combined the best of both worlds-the modern axiomatic approach of mathematics to obtain rigor with the older, 19th century Cambridge vision of mathematics as a description of a real world physical process.
The problem was that Keynes did not express his axiomatization of economics in specific axiom based mathematical terms. Moreover, in Chapter 21, Keynes disparagingly talked about the use of the "pseudo-mathematical method of formalizing a system of economic analysis" that encourages "blindly manipulating" the mathematical symbols of the system instead of keeping "at the back of our heads the necessary reserves and qualifications" required to make the mathematical system applicable to a real world phenomenon. [Keynes, 1936, p. 297 Arrow and-Debreu [Econometrica, 24, 1954, pp. 265-90] for it is this article that permanently shunted the study of economics away from the axiomatic system laid down by Keynes in The
General Theory and towards the special case axiomatic classical system of Debreu.
Weintraub notes that in 1930 Kurt Godel's paper suggested that Hilbert's quest for mathematical knowledge of consistency and complete certainty was not possible. This lead mathematicians to the more conservative claim that axiomatics could lead to "relative certainty"
if one was "able to show consistency relative to an extended set of postulates or axioms: if a proposition P was undecidable in system A, appending P to A (extending the axiom system) could assure P's truth as it were; for any system, truth as consistency was to be relative to the structure in which that system was embedded" (p. 100).
Thus it appears obvious to me, that when Keynes's general theory indicates that involuntary unemployment can occur even in a freely competitive market place with instantaneously flexible money wages and prices, the addition of the ergodic axiom, which Samuelson (1968) argues is necessary to make economics a science, and the gross substitution axiom assures that it is a mathematical truth that all markets will clear simultaneously. Yet, as will note later, Arrow and Hahn have shown that if the gross substitution axiom is not applicable, then all existence proofs are jeopardized.
In a very important statement, Weintraub sums up the argument of chapter 3:
"If mathematical knowledge is communal and contextual, and mathematical knowledge undergirds scientific knowledge, then the idea of scientific knowledge -a fortiori the idea of economic knowledge -has changed, as has the very idea of a rigorous scientific argument because of the emergence of the axiomatic approach to mathematics. Thus we have the split...between those who wold argue that mathematical rigor (and scientific knowledge) must develop not from axioms but from observations (about the economy) and economic data, so that the very truth of a theory or model may be tested or confirmed by reality... and those who would claim that mathematical (economic) models are rigorous (and true) in the only useful scientific sense of the word) if they are built on a cogent economic base -like von Neumann and Morgenstern, and Debreu." (p.. 100). In the latter view, truth and consistency are intertwined and consistency is established by relating the theory to a "model" known to be consistent.
This raises the important question: "what does one mean by "truth" in economic analysis?" Is "truth" reached merely by the use of any axiomatic theory that is consistent relative to an extended set of axioms. If a real world observation (e.g., involuntary unemployment) is not "true" within this extended axiomatic system, the addition of another axiom (e.g., rigid money wages and prices) make the system more complete and the empirical observation "true" within the enlarged axiomatic system.
As the new image of mathematics emerged in the early decades of the 20th century, it shaped the development of mathematical economics. "To preserve the relationship between rigor and truth, economists began to associate rigor with axiomatic development of economic theories, since axiomatization was seen as the path to discovery of new scientific truths" (p.98) This is the fundamental approach of mainstream economics since the end of the second world war.
Alternatively is "truth" obtained by an axiomatic theory based on the least number of assumptions ("a general theory of employment, interest and money") that is descriptive and applicable to reality? This alternative was Keynes's vision --as suggested in his analogy of comparing classical economists with Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world. It is also the belief that underlies Sidney Weintraub and my vision of a Post Keynesian economic theory
where that the axiomatic base should be a small as possible -but applicable to the real world in order to provide a more general theory of real world economic processes. Additional consistent axioms added to this general theory will produce special cases theories that may be true within their restrictive larger axiomatic foundation but these cases may, or may not be applicable to the real world. The onus is on those who add such restrictive axioms, e.g., Debreu, to demonstrate the relevance to the real world of their additional restrictive axioms of their specific case analysis.
I would agree that a fixity of prices assumption might not permit a free market automatic adjustment to restore full employment after a demand shock. Nevertheless, I would argue that even if a real world entrepreneurial system could be reflected in a "Euclidean" axiomatic system of instantaneous flexible prices, this flexibility of spot market prices assumption would not per se produce an automatic mechanism to assure full employment in either the short run or the long Bourbaki came to uphold the primacy of the pure over the applied, the rigorous over the intuitive" (p. 102). Bourbaki created an unbridgeable chasm between math and its applications in real world science, between the rigor of axiomatization and the rigor in the old sense of basing argumentation on physical problems. This Bourbaki desire for purity and isolation from the real world apparently did not unleash a backlash among natural scientists until the 1990's and it is now often claimed that the hold of "the Bourbaki plague is dying out" in the physical sciences (p. 103).
In economics, the Bourbaki philosophy was transplanted into post war American According to Weintraub, Baumol thought the paper was important enough to be published, but
Baumol "did not discuss why this might be the case". According to a letter from Georgescu Rogen, Phipps "concentrated on the axioms. Phipps is emphatically against publication until the paper is revised". Georgescu Rogen wrote to Strotz that Baumol's few comments were "trivial"
and that Baumol "did not check the argument in detail". Georgesceu Rogen admitted that although he had read the paper he "did not check the argument in detail.. But instead based his decision [to publish] on the reputation of the authors" (p. 198). Nevertheless Georgescu Rogen noted that Arrow and Debreu claimed the need for "strong assumptions" and that real world systems would be "deprived of such assumptions"--and therefore it is unlikely that such an equilibrium could exist in the real world (p. 195).
A comparison of an early draft of the manuscript with the published paper "shows that there were virtually no changes...between submission and publication". In essence this milestone paper was published because of the "reputation of the authors" although one referee was strongly against publication without revision. When Phipps wrote a letter to Strotz objecting to the article New inductees into the profession are taught that if they are to invest wisely their scarce human resources they should believe that the best of the discipline's scientific knowledge is contained in the current mainstream "scientific" literature, and to read the heterodox literature is a foolish waste of human capital. And as Weintraub argued earlier, because of the scarcity of human capital, "scientists" must take some components of their discipline as givens "intellectual paralysis awaits the scientist who seeks to reopen every foundational issue every day. For most economists the competitive equilibrium proof is a tool to use with little regard as to how the tool was constructed. Those who study science use the idea of a "black box" for settled results that are locked up and impenetrable....For every science black boxes are both healthy and necessary."
(P. 184) Thus the black box of the Arrow-Debreu axiomatic system has become the closed confine of the mainstream "scientific" mind. Accordingly, even the calls of Hahn , Arrow, and [Hahn,1973, pp. 14-16.] . Moreover, even one of the co-authors of the Arrow-Debreu system, Arrow [1974, p.8] In 1983 Hahn warned "The most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to the theorist is this: the best developed model of the economy cannot find room for it. The best developed model is, of course, the Arrow-Debreu version of a Walrasian general equilibrium. A world in which all conceivable contingent future contracts are possible neither needs or wants intrinsically worthless money. A first, and to a fastidious theorist difficult, task is to find an alternative construction." [Hahn, 1983, p.1] .
Similarly Tobin [1988, pp. 108-9] has written "Money has always been an awkward puzzle for neoclassical general equilibrium theory...there is no need for money holding... [yet] common sense tells us that money is held and has value....The makeshift compromise in neoclassical theory has been the alleged [axiom of the] neutrality of money....the application of this neutrality proposition to the actual real world monetary policies is a prime example of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness".
As some one who, since at least 1972 [Davidson, 1972] , has attempted to provide the "alternative construction" that Hahn has called for and developing "a serious monetary theory" in terms of contracts and money, while emphasizing the impossibility of have a complete set of futures contingency contracts in a world of nonergodic uncertainty, I have seen the mainstream continually ignore my analysis due to its lack of "rigor" i.e., its inconsistency with the black box of the Arrow-Debreu axiomatic system. Of course it may also be that I, like Phipps of propositions of classical economists such as Pigou and Irving Fisher in the language that these latter two used. Accordingly Keynes argued there are two objections to the second classical postulate of classical economics, namely that in equilibrium the real wage equals the marginal disutility of labor for this "clearly presumes that labour itself is in a position to decide the real wage for which it works" [Keynes, 1936, p. 11 ]. Keynes's two objections are (1) the actual behavior of labor and (2) "there may be no method available to labour as a whole where it can bring the wage-good equivalent into conformity with the marginal disutility of the current volume of employment" [Keynes, 1936, pp.12-13] . [Keynes] insights were several orders more profound and realistic..... These insights seem to me to make it impossible to take a Walrasian long-run equilibrium, or for that matter a rational expectations equilibrium, as descriptively satisfactory" [Hahn, 1983, pp. x-xi, emphasis added] .
We are indebted to Weintraub, for in this masterful book, he shows with the utmost clarity that the mathematical scientist emperor of mainstream economics is without any clothes.
